In a report which will be presented to Congress this Friday (February 9th, 2007), the DOD's inspector general will clear former Pentagon policy chief Douglas J. Feith (pictured left) of any charges that he engaged in illegal activities through the creation of special offices to review intelligence.
Some Democrats have contended that Feith misled Congress about the basis of the administration's assertions on the threat posed by Iraq, but the Pentagon’s investigation did not support that.
Two people familiar with the findings discussed the main points and some details Thursday on condition they’re anonymity be protected.
Asked to comment on the IG's findings, Feith responded in a telephone interview that he hadn’t seen the report but was pleased to hear that it concluded his office's activities were neither illegal nor unauthorized.
Feith, however, took strong issue over IG's finding that some activities had been "inappropriate."
"The policy office has been smeared for years by allegations that its pre-Iraq-war work was somehow `unlawful' or `unauthorized' and that some information it gave to congressional committees was deceptive or misleading," Feith said.
Feith called the inspector general's conclusion that some intelligence activities by the Office of Special Plans, created while Feith served as the undersecretary of defense for policy — the top policy position under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld — were inappropriate but not unauthorized as "bizarre.”
"Clearly, the inspector general's office was willing to challenge the policy office and even stretch some points to be able to criticize it," Feith said, adding that he felt this amounted to subjective "quibbling" by the IG.
Feith left his Pentagon post in August 2005 to teach at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He’s steadfastly maintained that their intelligence activities were prudent, authorized and useful in challenging some of the intelligence analysis of the CIA.
At the center of the prewar intelligence controversy was the work of a small number of Pentagon officials from Feith's office and the office of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who reviewed CIA intelligence analyses and put together their own report.
When they briefed Rumsfeld on their report in August 2002 — a period when Vice President Dick Cheney and other administration officials were ratcheting up their warnings about the gravity of the Iraq threat — Rumsfeld directed them to also brief CIA Director George Tenet. Their presentation, which included assertions about links between al-Qaida and the Iraqi government, contained a criticism that the intelligence community was ignoring or underplaying its own raw reports on such potential links.
Differing opinion on Iraqi/al-Qaida links
Some Democrats have contended that Feith misled Congress about the basis of the administration's assertions on the threat posed by Iraq, but the Pentagon’s investigation did not support that.
Two people familiar with the findings discussed the main points and some details Thursday on condition they’re anonymity be protected.
Asked to comment on the IG's findings, Feith responded in a telephone interview that he hadn’t seen the report but was pleased to hear that it concluded his office's activities were neither illegal nor unauthorized.
Feith, however, took strong issue over IG's finding that some activities had been "inappropriate."
"The policy office has been smeared for years by allegations that its pre-Iraq-war work was somehow `unlawful' or `unauthorized' and that some information it gave to congressional committees was deceptive or misleading," Feith said.
Feith called the inspector general's conclusion that some intelligence activities by the Office of Special Plans, created while Feith served as the undersecretary of defense for policy — the top policy position under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld — were inappropriate but not unauthorized as "bizarre.”
"Clearly, the inspector general's office was willing to challenge the policy office and even stretch some points to be able to criticize it," Feith said, adding that he felt this amounted to subjective "quibbling" by the IG.
Feith left his Pentagon post in August 2005 to teach at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He’s steadfastly maintained that their intelligence activities were prudent, authorized and useful in challenging some of the intelligence analysis of the CIA.
At the center of the prewar intelligence controversy was the work of a small number of Pentagon officials from Feith's office and the office of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who reviewed CIA intelligence analyses and put together their own report.
When they briefed Rumsfeld on their report in August 2002 — a period when Vice President Dick Cheney and other administration officials were ratcheting up their warnings about the gravity of the Iraq threat — Rumsfeld directed them to also brief CIA Director George Tenet. Their presentation, which included assertions about links between al-Qaida and the Iraqi government, contained a criticism that the intelligence community was ignoring or underplaying its own raw reports on such potential links.
Differing opinion on Iraqi/al-Qaida links
In a dissenting view attached to the committee's report, three Democratic senators, including Levin, said that Pentagon policymakers sought to undermine the analysis of the intelligence community by circumventing the CIA and briefing their own views directly to the White House. This was a particular problem when the spy agencies' judgments did not conform to the administration's dire views on Iraqi links to al-Qaida, the senators said.
Later, two senators — Levin and Pat Roberts, R-Kan. — separately asked the Pentagon's inspector general to review the role of Feith's office. It was not immediately clear whether the intelligence committee would press ahead with its own investigation, or if the inspector general's report would suffice.
Eric Edelman, Feith’s successor as undersecretary of defense for policy, wrote a response to a draft of the IG's report last month, claiming that the activity deemed by the IG to be "inappropriate" was actually "an exercise in alternative thinking" conducted at Wolfowitz's direction.
Edelman has claimed that the IG had misinterpreted "what the (Pentagon's) work actually was — namely, a critical assessment by OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) for policy purposes of IC (Intelligence Community) reporting and finished IC products on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida."
In short – “The invasion of Iraq was not based on lies.”
Later, two senators — Levin and Pat Roberts, R-Kan. — separately asked the Pentagon's inspector general to review the role of Feith's office. It was not immediately clear whether the intelligence committee would press ahead with its own investigation, or if the inspector general's report would suffice.
Eric Edelman, Feith’s successor as undersecretary of defense for policy, wrote a response to a draft of the IG's report last month, claiming that the activity deemed by the IG to be "inappropriate" was actually "an exercise in alternative thinking" conducted at Wolfowitz's direction.
Edelman has claimed that the IG had misinterpreted "what the (Pentagon's) work actually was — namely, a critical assessment by OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) for policy purposes of IC (Intelligence Community) reporting and finished IC products on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida."
In short – “The invasion of Iraq was not based on lies.”
